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Rather than ease up, the MFA has been getting tougher on most
developing country exporters of textiles and clothing.  Trade
gains for new exporters (except for marginal suppliers) due to
MFA  have been exaggerated;  main  beneficiaries  were  the
domestic producers in industrial countries.
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After analyzing data on trade and restrictions in  * The unit value of shipments subject to
U.S., EC, Canadian, and Swedish markets  binding quotas increased substantially more than
during the 1980s, Erzan, Goto, and Holmes  the unit value of unconstrained items.
conclude that:
- Developing countries that were new export-
R  Rather than ease up, the Multi-Fibre Ar-  ers of textile products hoped to capture a larger
rangement (MFA) became more restrictive, par-  share of the textile market as a result of quotas
ticularly for relatively rew suppliers, during the  set for other developing countries.  But c. 2ept
1980s. Proportionately more shipments were  for marginal suppliers who emerged largely
subject to quotas.  The MFA's grip was tighter  because of the MFA, the needy countries have
on clothing than on textiles but the pattem  benefited little from the MFA.  And countries
across markets and over time was the same for  whose exports grow soon find themselves on the
both.  restricted list.
* Volume generally grew less where quotas  *  Domestic producers in the United States
were binding.  have benefited most from the MFA.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The  paper  addresses  two  issues: (i)  the  extent  of the
restrictiveness/effectiveness  of the  MFA  with respect  to the  developing
country  suppliers  of textile  products  during  the  1980s,  and (ii)  the  extent
to  which  these  restrictions  yield  trade  gains  for  the  unconstrained/less
established  developing  suppliers.
That there  has  been  an escalation  in  the  product  and  country
coverage  of restrictions  in  major  industrial  markets  under  the  Multi-Fibre
Arrangement  (HFA)  during  the  1980s  is  well-documented  (by  the  Textiles
Surveillance  Body  and  Raffaelli  (1989)). However,  attempts  to apply  some
measure  to this  apparent  change  in the  restrictiveness,  and  more  generally
the  potency  of  HFA in  distorting  trade  and investment  face  two  major
problems,  bar the  common  methodological  questions. The first  set  of
problems  relates  to the  complexity  of the  management  of the  restrictions
under  MFA.  Various  provisions  of "i.axibility",  i.e.,  "swing",  "carry
over",  "carry  forward"  and  their  often  nonsystematic  application  make  a
precise  identification  of the  ex ante  effective  quotas  virtually
impossible.
The second  set  of difficulties  is  of a statistical  nature  and  stems
from  the  ways in  which  products  are  grouped,  quotas  are  speciffed  and  data
on actual  shipments  are  compiled. Each  importer  defines  its  own  MFA
groups,  mainly  based  on the  sensitivity  of the  products  for  its  domestic
industry. Quozas  are  specified  and  monitored  in  volume  terms  and  often  the2
statistics  pertain  to the  MFA groups  rather  than  the  underlying  national
tariff  classifications.  While  import  values  for  the  products  are  available
per tariff  line,  these  sometimes  are  not  matched  with the  MFA groups. 1
Furthermore,  detailed  national  nomenclatures  match  with international  trade
classifications  only  at more  aggregate  levels.
To remedy  some  of the  statistical  problems  faced  in  analyzing  the
trade  effects  of the  MFA,  an effort  is  being  made  at the  World  Bank  to
construct  a consistent  data  base (see  the  Appendix  on data). Currently,
this  data  base covets  the  EC,  US,  Canadian  and  Swedish  markets.
Using  this  data  base,  first,  in  Section  II,  the  developments  in the
markets  under  question  are  reviewed  in terms  of the  share  of trade  subject
to  bilateral  restrictions,  quota  utilization  rates  end  shipments  which  fall
under  binding  quotas. In  Section  III,  the  supply  and  market  response  of
individual  developing  exporters  are  characterized  on the  basis  of the
proportion  of their  trade  covered  by quotas  and  their  average  quota
utilization  rates. This two-dimensional  characterization  is then  used to
trace  the  pattern  in the  tightening  of the  MFA restrictions  over time.
While  Sections  II and  III  attempt  to  evaluate  some  aspects  of the
evolution  in the  use  of  MFA restrictions  in relation  to  the  performance  of
the  suppliers  facing  them,  Section  IV  studies  the  changes  in  the  volume  and
unit  value  of shipments  subject  to  highly/fully  utilized  quotas  as evidence
of the  restrictiveness/effectiveness  of  MFA.  This  also  constitutes  a test
1 Although  the  US  and  EC  do  have  clear  definitions  as  to  which  tariff  lines
comprise  a given  MFA  category  and  quotas,  this  is  not  always  the  case in  other
markets.3
of our  working  definition  of a  binding  quota  wisich  we identify  by
utilization  rates.
As to the  second  question  addressed  concerning  trade  diversion,  in
Section  V, trade  in  products  which  were subject  to  binding  quotas  for  the
major  established  exporters  are traced  to determine  which  foreign  suppliers
tended  to  benefit. Finally,  in  Section  VI, trade  diversion  in a
representative  sample  of  apparel  products  is  analyzed  in a  more rigorous
framework  using  a  system  of simultaneous  equations  depicting  the  demand  and
alternative  supply  conditions.  Simulations  are  undertaken  to estimate  the
likely  magnitude  of trade  diverted  to  unconstrained  developing  exporters.
A cnncluding  section  (Section  VII) relates  the  findings  of the
paper  to the  theme  of the  Workshop.
II.  TRENDS  IN  MAJOR  MARKETS  AND  A TYPOLOGY  OF SUPPLIERS
UNDER  MFA
The  EC and  US accounted  for,  respectively,  37.8  and  40  percent  of
OECD  2  imports  of textile  fibers,  textiles,  clothing  and  other  textile
goods  - henceforth  textile  products  3  from  developing  countries  4  in 1987.
With the  inclusion  of two  smaller  economies,  Canada  (3.3  percent)  and
2  OECD  excluding  Turkey.
3  In this  section,  for  comparability  across  markets,  textile  products
are  defined  exhaustively  as  all  textile  fibers,  textiles,  clothing  and  related
goods  covered  by  MFA  categories  of  any  of  the  importing  countries  at  any  point
in time during  the 1981-1987  period.  To obtain  total  imports  of textile
products  as the  common  denominator,  the  product  group  was  defined  broadly  in
SITC. It consists  of SITC  (rev.2)  26  +  65  +  83  +  84  +  (6123  +  62103  +  66494
+  82122  +  85104  +  85105  +  89594  +  89984).
'  For  the  definition  of  developing  countries,  see  the  Appendix  on data.4
Sweden  (1.4  percent),  they  represented  82.6  percent  of this  market. From
1981  to 1986,  the  share  of their  combined  imports  of textile  products  from
developing  countries  in imports  from  all  sources  increased  from  60 to 64
percent.  5  In 1987  there  was  a  rapid  surge  to 69  percent.  6
Against  this  background,  we introduce  four  indicators  of the
coverage,  and indirectly  of the  restrictiveness  of MFA:  (i)  Restricted
imports,  i.e.  imports  subject  to  bilateral  quotas,  as a percentage  of total
ijports  of textile  products  from  developing  countries  (REST/TOT). (ii)
Imports  from  developing  countries  subject  to "binding  quotas"  (defined  by
utilization  rates  of 90 percent  and  above)  as a percentage  of total  imports
from  developing  countries  (BIND/TOT). (iii)  Imports  from  developing
countries  subject  to  binding  restrictions  as a percentage  of restricted
imports  from  developing  countries  (BIND/REST).  Finally,  (iv)  average  quota
utilization  rates.  7  These  four  indicators  are  presented,  respectively,  in
colt'mns  II to  V of Table  1 for  the  EC,  US,  Canada,  Sweden,  and  their
aggregate,  for  the  period  1981-1987.
It  should  be stressed  that  these  indicators  are  only  probabilistic
yardsticks  of the  restrictiveness  of HFA: Trade  subject  to quotas  is  more
likely  to  be harrassed  than  trade  which  takes  place  outside  quotas. Higher
5  Excluding  intra-EC  trade.
6  For comparability  with 1986,  when EC(10) rather  than EC(12)  was
considered,  this  ratio  was 68  percent.
7  In  averaging  quota  utilization  over  MFA  groups,  any  utilization  rate
above  115  percent  was  assumed  to  arise  from  data  deficiency  since  15  percent
is often  the  maximum  flexibility  in  quota  utilization. In these  cases  the
quotas  were  adjusted  upwards  to  yield  utilization  rates  of 115  percent.5
quota  utilization  rates  and  increasing  proportions  of shipments  reaching
quota  limits  entail  greater  probability  of  cases  of export  restraint  and
outright  rejection  of import  licences. Or  rhe  other  hane,  even  full
quotautilization  concerning  a certain  shipment  does  not  necessarily  imply  a
binding  constraint  since  the  quota  could  be "just  redundant"  meaning  that
shipments  could  have  been exactly  the  same  had there  been no quota.  8 This
latter  question  is  addressed  in  Section  III  and  the  link  between  high
- tilization  rates  and  their  restraining  effects  is  established.
As a snapshot  of the  overall  situation  as  well  as to  clarify  the
content  of the indicators,  we first  review  the  developments  in the
aggregate  of the  four  markets. The  trade  coverage  ratio  of restrictions,
REST/TOT,  with all  developing  countries  in its  denominator  was rather
stable  in  a  narrow  range  of 46 to 50  percent  over  the  period. Giver.  the
fact  that  new suppliers  were  drawn  into  the  MFA 9  and  additional  products
were  put  under  quotas,  a stable  trade  -ecvcrage  ratio  implies  a
disproportionate  expansion  of the  imp-,  :s  3f  r.onarestricted  products. This
is  the  reflection  of a relative  slowdown  in imports  which  were subject  to
quotas.
It should  also  be noted  that  the  relatively  low  overall  coverage
ratio  of 46 to 50  percent  is  due to  the  exhaustive  definition  of textile
products  used in the  denominator.  As the  MFA  product  catagories  are  market
specific,  for  consistency  across  markets,  to  serve  as a common  denominator,
a  Furthermore  there  are the  flexibility  provisions  in  applying  quotas
as well  as the  possibility  of significant  revisions  of quota  levels.
9  See  table  AI.l in the  Appendix.6
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lCe  1961  56.S  40.3  20.6  51.7  6e.3
19t2  57.0  39.7  0.1  50.5  67.5
1963  57.9  40.4  18.6  46.0  0.5
1986  58.5  39.9  16.3  45.9  71.6
1965  57.2  39.1  1i.3  48.2  48.6
1966  58.6  36.9  25.4  85.3  74.5
1967  67.1  36.2  21.9  60.7  i2.1
19t1-1987  59.7  38.6  20.9  54.0  72.1
US  191  77.6  52.5  37.9  72.1  67.7
1962  79.2  51.0  37.5  73.4  6.O
1983  79.2  S6.1  43.9  73.3  R.4
1964  77.2  54.6  39.2  71.5  87.8
19t5  75.7  53.4  35.3  66.5  7.0
19"  76.0  5T.2  45.0  78.3  60.8
1967  78.6  61.9  47.5  76.7  81.8
1961-1967  77.5  56.2  41.6  74.3  7n.o
Canada  1961  35.3  47.9  19.1  39.9  73.4
1962  38.9  54.5  37.5  68.9  60.4
1963  40.6  52.8  6.3  87.7  90.4
1984  43.7  50.6  45.9  90.4  92.4
1985  42.8  51.9  41.3  79.5  89.6
1966  46.3  49.6  42.4  85.5  86.1
1967  49.9  54.2  37.1  68.6  84.7
1981-1986  43.3  51.8  39.4  76.0  86.1
Sweden  1981  24.2  53.1  24.6  46.4  82.2
1962  25.2  61.7  41.1  66.5  66.7
1963  24.0  60.0  22.2  36.9  65.8
1966  24.4  59.4  29.6  49.6  85.9
1965  23.0  57.5  34.5  60.0  81.9
1968  23.5  54.8  45.3  62.6  93.2
1987  26.4  49.9  43.9  87.9  97.9
1981-t987  24.5  55.7  36.1  64.7  68.2
EC, uS,  1981  60.3  4.1  28.1  61.0  68.60
Cub  1962  62.1  45.9  29.1  63.4  66.90
NW  1963  63.7  49.0  32.4  68.2  75.3U
Swedin  19t4  64.7  48.8  31.2  63.8  70.5'
1965  63.6  47.9  29.4  61.3  73.4S
19t6  64.;  49.2  36.8  74.8  79.  S
1967  69.2  49.6  3S.3  71.2  82.3
19181-196  64.5  48.4  32.4  67.1  74n7
S4urce:  Wrlid  anx cotter  fitn  on NhFA  ad  tiSO  COTUOe  Data latt  (use the Appndix  on dats).
(a)  See the Appndix  on date for  definition  of  devtoping  countries.  The ares  (Cot.  I-lV)
era vaiu  shamt.  Utilization  (COl. V) fI  a  on quentitin.
(b)  Textitl  progts  are defined broadty  sat  alt  goods  covered by NFA  categries  of  eny of  the
rfwting  coutntriee at  any point  in  tim  eduing the 1961-1967  period  wid consist of  SITC
(rov.2)  26 *  65 *  63  *  84 *  (6123 * 62103  * 68494  *  62122  * 85104  * 85105  *  69594  * 8964).
(c)  iestricted  iportu:  iports  Jject to bitaterat  quote.
(d)  Ieer.  awbject to binding  reetritioet  s  shiptes  for  fich  equote utilization  rates  wr
90 percnt  or  hioer.
te)  A  nxil  of  115 per ce nt qota utiliation  was  altloed  in  tekins  amr  ross NFA
cateorin.
(f)  1981-1966  ECCIO). 196i7  EC2).  Trade  arne  etude  Intra-IC  trade.
(g)  Approximte  weighted average across  rkete  uinr  restricted  trad  values as weihts.7
a  'universal"  set  of textile  products  was  defined  in terms  of the  SITC.  10
The second  indicator,  BIND/TOT,  as it  has trade  subject  to  binding
quotas  in its  numerator,  gives  the  share  of trade  which is  effectively
restricted. This  indicator  has increased  by roughly  one  third,  from  28 to
35  percent  during  the  1981-1987  period. The third  measure,  BIND/REST,  is
more  focused  and  stands  as  a proxy  for  the  restrictiveness  of the  quotas.
This  had  a  high  value  of 61  percent  already  in  1981 (and  as the  REST/TOT
ratio  remained  stable),  it  has  increased  proportionately  with BIND/TOT,  to
71  percent  in  1987.  Finally,  the  overall  average  quota  utilization  in the
four  markets,  11  an alternative  proxy  to  BIND/REST,  increased,  with  some
cyclical  swings,  from  69  percent  in  1984  to  82 percent  in 1987.
Deelo,uments  in Individual  Markets
There  are  considerable  differences  among  the  markets  considered  in
terms  of the  share  of imports  from  developing  countries  in textile
products. While  Sweden  received,  on average  only  one  quarter  of its
imports  from  developing  countries,  this  share  was  over three  quarters  for
the  US.  Imports  from  developing  countries  accounted  for,  on average,  60
percent  of the  EC's  imports  of textile  products. The  relatively  low
figures  for  the  EC and  Sweden  are  in  part  due  to  EFTA,  to  which  Sweden
belongs,  and the  barrier-free  trade  between  EFTA  and the  EC.  With the
exception  of 1987  which  wit-nessed  a surge  in et1l  four  markets  under
10 See  footnote  2.
11  Overall  average  quota  utilization  rates are rough approxiwations
obtained  by taking  averages  across  the  markets  by using  values  of restricted
trade  as  weights.8
consideration,  Canada  was the  case (followed  by the  EC)  for  which  the
developing  countries'  share  registered  a  major  increase,  from  35 percent  in
1981  to 50  percent  in 1987.
The  trade  coverage  ratio  of restrictions  (REST/TOT)  wa  generally
stable  around  55  percent  except  in  EC  where  this  was in  the  proximity  of  40
percent. Fur  the  EC,  the  share  of imports  from  developing  countries  under
binding  constraints  (BlND/TOT)  was  also  considerably  low,  around  20
percent,  compared  to the  other  three  markets,  which  on average  wa  twice  &a
much  and  registered  significant  increases  during  the  1981-1967  period.
The  share  of  rr-tricted  shipments  which  came  under  binding  quotas
(BIND/REST)  was  the  highest  in  the  US and  Canada,  on  the  average  74 and  76
percent,  respectively.  There  was  a  secular  and  substantial  increase  of
this  ratio  in  all  markets. Finally,  the  average  quota  utlilzation  rates
rose  in  a parallel  fashion,  reaching  values  above  80  percent  in  all  four
markets.
Reviewing  the  four  markets  individually  using  the  proxies  for  the
coverage  and,  indirectly  for  the  restrictiveness  of MFA,  we conclude  that
there  was  no  noteworthy  sign  of relaxation  of the  regime. On the  contrary,
almost  all  proxies  registered  significant  increases  during  the  1981.1987
period  indicating  a tightening  of the  MFA in  the  four  markets.
It should  be noted,  however,  that  besides  indicating  the
predominant  trend  over  time,  the  data  pre  -ited here  do not  provide  a solid
basis  for  comparisons  across  markets. Firstly,  there  are  some  definitional
and  statistical  inconsistencies,  sotie  of  which  are  spelled  out in  the
Appendix  on data.  Secondly,  the  admlnistration  of the  MFA  regimes  can  vary
considerably  across  markets. In  particular  the  comparison  between  the  EC9
and  the  US suffers  from  the  fact  that,  on top  of the  quotas  negotiated  by
the  Community,  indkOidual  EC  members  can  resort  to the  safeguard  clause
contained  in the  EC treaty  to  curtail  imports.  12 Furthermore,  there  are
safeguards  clauses  in  EC's  preferential  trade  agreements  which  allow
surveillande  and-protective  measures. The  EC also  has  concluded  informal
arrangements  with some  Mediterranean  countries  without  explicitly  referring
to the  trade  agreements'  safeguards  provisions.  13  Finally  there  were
major  differences  in  the  activity  levels  of  West  Europe  and  North  America
and substantial  c1anges  in the  dollar  rate  during  the  period  under  study.
At any  given  ti,g,  differences  in  the  demand  conditions  and  the  relative
attractiveness  of the  two  major  markets  can  overshadow  the  differences
attributable  to  the  MFA restrictions.
Clothing  versus  Textiles
Do the  patterns  observed  for  the  broadly  defined  textile  products
hold  when  clothing  items  are  considered  alone?
The.  comparative  advantage  of developing  countries  is  more
pronounced  in  clothing  than  in textiles  and  man-made  fibers. A major
12  Article  115  of the  EC  Treaty  contains  a safeguard  clause  to  control
the  free  movement  of  goods  between  individual  EC  members.  This  prevents  goods
from  outside  the  EC that  have  been  shipped  to  one  EC  country  from  being  resold
or "deflected"  into  another  member  country. Thus,  in  the  extreme,  a ban  on
the  import  of textile  items  can  be imposed  by separate  EC  countries,  if  prior
authorization  is  given  by the  EC Commission.
Most  Article  115  petitions  are  for  textile  items,  and  most  petitions
are  granted! In 1985,  for  example,  out  of 211  total  petitions,  143  were for
textiles  and  of these  textile  petitions,  119  were  granted.
13  In this  cortext,  EC's  arrangement  with the  Turkish  Association  of
Textile  Exporters  is  particularly  important  due  to  the  fact  that  Turkey  is  one
of the  main suppliers  in  this  market.10
difference  seems  to  be the  greater  possibilities  to apply  capital  intensive
technolog'les  to the  latter  products. As a  matter  of fact,  textile
production  in the  industrial  countries,  especially  in the  EC,  made  a
revival  during  the  1980s  (GATT  (1987)). Given  these  considerations,
differences  might  be expected  in  the  restrictiveness  of the  MFA  vis-a-vis
clothing  versus  textiles.
The  yardsticks  applied  to the  broad  group  of textlle  products  were
calculated  for  clothing  items.  14 From  the  results  reported  in Table  2,
compared  to those  in  Table  1,  no major  differences  were  observed  in the
patterns  across  the  markets  or  over time. The  main  difference  was the
level  of import  market  share  of developing  countries  and the  trade  coverage
ratio  of  quotas. Both  this  share  and  the  coverage  ratio  were almost
uniformly  ten  percentage  points  higher  for  clothing  compared  to  the  broad
group  of textile  products  in  both  periods. On the  other  hand, the  ratio  of
imports  under  binding  quotas  as  a percentage  of imports  subject  to
restrictions,  and  the  level  of average  quota  utilization  rates  for  clothing
closely  resembled  that  for  all  textile  products. From  these  results,  it
can  be concluded  that  restrictions  on clothing  were less  selective  or  more
general  compared  to textiles. Nevertheless  the  general  trend  of increasing
restrictiveness  held for  both.
14  Clothing  was  defined as the aggregate  of market specific  MFA
categories  corresponding  to  SITC  84 to serve  as a common  denominator.Table  2:  THE SHARE  OF DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  IN CLOTaING  IHFG Th
OF THE  EC.  US.  CANAD AND  SWEDEN
UND  INDICATORS  OF THE  COVERAGE  AND  RZSTRICTIVENESS  OF WA
1981  AND 1987
(per  cett)
I  II  III  IV  V
laports  from  Restricted  imports  Imports  from  Imports  from  Average  quota
developing  from  developing  developing  developing  subject  utilization
countrios  as  a  as  a percentage  subject  to  binding  to  binding  rates
percentage  of  total  of  total  imports  restrictions  as  a  restrictions
imports  of  clothing  from  developing  percentage  of  total  as  a  percentage  of
(Trade  coverage  ratio  imports  from  restricted  liports
or  REST/TOT)  developing  from  devoloping
(BIND/TOT)  (BIND/REST)
EC  1981  71.7  54.4  29.8  54.8  68.7
1987  83.7  46.0  28.3  61.8  87.7
US  1981  88.9  68.3  51.1  74.8  72.4
1987  87.3  76.5  58.8  76.9  84.4
Canada  1981  72.1  56.8  22.6  39.7  70.2
1987  74.5  74.1  57.4  77.4  89.5  F
Sweden  1981  30.9  68.5  32.7  47.7  85.0
1987  32.8  57.3  49.4  86.2  95.1
EC. US.  1981  76.4  61.5  39.9  64.8  71.2
Canada  and  1987  82.2  63.7  46.2  72.6  65.8
Sweden
Source: World  Bank  computer  files  on  MFA and  UNSO  COTRADE Data  Bose  (se the  Appendix  on Data).
Note:  Clothing  is  dofined  as  SITC  84. For  all  other  details,  see  notes  to  Table  1.12
III.  MFA SYNDROME  FOR DEVELOPING  EXPORTERS
Individual  developing  countries  were  affected  by and  responded  to
the  quotas  on their  exports  of textile  products  in  different  ways.  The
proportion  of the  countries'  exports  subject  to  quotas  and their  rate  of
quota  utilization  are two  dimensions  which  provide  a basis  for  the
characterization  of these  supply  and  market  responses.
To demonstrate  the  point,  at one  extreme  were suppliers  with  only  a
few  products  facing  quotas,  who  were  unable  to  come  close  to filling  them.
At the  other  extreme  were  diversified  exporters  with  quotas  on almost  all
products  who  used  them  to the  fullest  extent. These  extremities
characterize  supply  versus  market  constrained  situations. Consequetitly  a
transition  from  the  former  to the  latter  state  increases  the importance  of
conditions  of access  to the  markets. Furthermore,  as this  tranbition
involves  imposition  of  new quotas  and  their  utilization  to the  limit,  the
regime  can  be  branded  as  becoming  more  restrictive.
We shall  observe  that  this  caricature  resembles  the  predominant
evolution  for  the  developing  suppliers  in the  EC and  US markets.
Figures  1  and 2  give  the  two-dimensional  characterization  of the
individual  developing  suppliers  in  the  EC  and  US markets,  respectively.
The  vertical  axis  in the  scatter  diagrams  indicates  the  proportion  of
imports  of textile  products  subject  to  quotas  while  the  average  quota
utilization  rate  is  measured  along  the  horizontal  axis.  In the  upper
diagrams  of  both Figures,  exporters  are  plotted  by their  1981-1983  period13
averages.  and  the  lower  diagrams  depict  the  1985-1987  situation.  15 As
textile  products  in this  case  are  defined  narrowly  by the  EC's  and  US' own
NFA categories,  respectively,  the  standing  of a supplier  in the  two  markets
is  not  directly  comparable.  16
The  overall  impression  from  the  diagrams  is  of a concentration  of
exporters  In the  second  period  into  the  North  East  quarter. More
specifically,  it  can  be observed  that  among  the  22  exporters  in the  EC
market depicted  for  both  periods,  11  of them  (China,  Egypt,  Hong  Kong,
India,  Indonesia,  Macao,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  Sri  Lanka  and
Thailand)  *nde  a positive  move  on  both  axes  towards  full  trade  coverage  and
quota  utilitatLon. Another  two (Korea  and  Taiwan)  maintained  their  already
"high positions. In the  US market  there  were 22  developing  suppliers
under  restrictions  in  both  periods  and  again  11  of them  (Brazil,  China,
India.  Indonesia,  Macao,  Mexico,  Romania,  Singapore,  Sri  Lanka,  Thailand
and  Yugoslavia)  moved  in the  North  East  direction. Four  more  exporters
Is  Weighted  averages  for  the  periods  1981-1983  and  1985-1987. When  an
exporter  was subject  to restrictions  during  only part of the period,  the
average  pertaIns  to the  applicable  year(s).
t  Note that in Table  1 textile  products  were defined  broadly  in SITC
to  serve  as  a comon denominator.  Overall  trade  coverage  ratios,  especially
in  the  eC, are  considerably  higher  when  based  on own  MFA  categories.
EC  - US
1981-1983  -1987  1981-1983 1985-1987
Trade  covered  by quotas,  X  63.1  63.4  78.9  83.3
Average  quota  utilization,  X  68.4  75.3  70.1  80.114
Figzre  1:  SHARE  OF IMPORTS  OF TEXTILE PRODUCTS  SUBJECT TO QUOTAS  AND AVERAGE
QUOTA  UTILIZATION RATES FOR DEVELOPING  SUPPLIERS IN  THE EC MARKET,
1981-1983  AND 1985-1987
EC:  1981-1983
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Source: World  Bank  computer  files  on  MFA (see  the  Appendix  on data).
Note_:  Trade  coverage  ratios  are  based  on EC's imports  in its  own MFA
categories  (as  opposed  to the  broadest  definition  of textile  products  based on
SITC).15
Figure  2:  SHARE  OF IMPORTS  OF TEXTILE  PRODUCTS  SUBJECT  TO QUOTAS  AND AVERAGE
QtlOTA  UTILIZATION RATES FOR DEVELOPING  SUPPLIERS IN  THE US MARKET,
1981-1983  AND 1985-1987
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Source: World  Bank  computer  files  on MFA (see  the  Appendix  on data).
Note:  Trade  coverage  ratios  are  based  on  US imports  in its  own  MFA  categories
(as  opposed  to the  broadest  definition  of textile  products  based  on SITC).16
(Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Pakistan  and  Taiwan)  were stable  in  the  proximity  of the
North  Eastern  corner  of the  diagram. Among  these  suppliers,  ten (China,
Hong  Kong,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Macao,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  Taiwan  and
Thailand)  had  a similar  evolution  in  both  markets  and  four  of them (Hong
Kong,  Korea,  Taiwan  and, to  a lesser  extent,  Thailand)  were  more or less
'tied  up"  in terms  of product  coverage  and  quota  limits.
In the  US market,  a dozen  emerging  exporters  were  placed  under
restrictions  in the  1985-1987  period. Half  of these,  especially  Bangladesh
and  Turkey,  started  their  ordeal  with a  high  coverage  and  tight  quotas  on
their  limited  products.
Seven  exporters  in the  EC market  (Brazil,  Colombia,  Malaysia,
Mexico,  Romania,  Uruguay  and  Yugoslavia)  and three  in the  US market  (Costa
Rica,  Dominican  Republic  and  Haiti)  drifted  towards  lower  trade  coverage
and/or  quota  utilization. Furthermore,  for  two  suppliers  in the  EC
(Argentina  and  Singapore)  and  three  in  the  US market  (Colombia,  Malaysia
and  the  Philippines),  product  coverage  and  quota  utilization  rates  moved  in
the  opposite  direction.
Differences  among  country  experiences  and inconsistencies  in
performance  across  the  two  markets  underline  the  importance  of supply
conditions,  including  the  administrative  capacity  for  effective  utilization
of quotas  (Hamilton  1986b). Low  quota  utilization  rates  can  be traced  to
the  anti-export  bias in  the  case  of some  countries,  and  political
distruptions  in  some  others. Another  explanation  is increasing  labor  costs17
and  the  consequent  shift  in  comparative  advantage.  17
The  most  efficient  suppliers  always  make  the  best use  of the
prevailing  market  conditions.  The irony  of discriminatory  protectionism,
in this  case  the  MFA  restrictions,  is  that  good  performance  is  punished.
When a supplier  shows  a  potential  in  a  market,  its  most  promising  products
are  covered  by quotas. Emerging  suppliers  usually  start  with a low
coverage  ratio  and  utilization  rate,  although  there  are  some  exceptions.  16
If they  perform  as expected,  they  soon  hit the  quota  ceilings  in those
limited  goods. They  can  move into  new  products,  although  these  will also
become  subject  to restrictions.  Growth  of quota  ceilings  do  not catch  up
with the  expansion  of successful  suppliers'  shipments,  and  product
diversification  is  more than  compensated  by imposition  of restrictions  on
the  emerging  products.
The  moral  of the  story  is  that  it is  not  only  the  exports  of the
established  suppliers  which  come  under  binding  constraints.  The  newcomers,
which  might  to some  extent  benefit  from  restrictions  on the  major
suppliers,  soon  find  themselves  pressed;  the  more  successful  they  are,  the
faster  and  tighter  they  are  embraced  by the  MFA.
17  This  appears  to  be the  case  of Singapore. Presumably  due to quota
rents,  the  phenomenon  does  not  seem  to  surface  often.
18  An  emerging  exporter  which  gains  competitiveness  in  a limited  number
of  products  can  soon  fully  utilize  its  quotas. This  was  the  case  for  half  of
thc  dozen  newcomers  in  the  US market.18
IV.  PRICE  AND  VCLUME  EFFECTS  OF BINDING  QUOTAS
Volume  restraints  on developing  countries'  exports  of textile
products,  inte all,  raise  domestic  prices  in  importing  markets  (Cline
(1987),  Hamilton  (1984),  Hufbauer  ; Al  (1988),  Jenkins  (1980),  Spinanger
and  Zietz  (1986)  and  Tarr  and  Morkre  (1984));  yield  quota  rents  to
established  suppliers  (Hamilton  (1988),  Pelzman  (1988)  and  Tarr  and  Morkre
(1984));  and  induce  "upgrading'  of the  products  exported  (Cline  (1987)  and
Wolf (1987)). It Is the  quantification  of such  effects  which  gives  direct
evidence  as to the  extent  and  the  eventual  intensification  of the
distortions  of the  MFA.  In this  Section,  we simply  compare  the
developments  during  the  period  1981-1987  in  the  volume  and  unit  value  of
imports  subject  to  binding  quotas  with those  shipments  under  nonbinding
quotas. The comparison  serves  two  purposes. First,  it is a rough
indicator  of the  changes  in  the  effectiveness  of  MFA.  Secondly,  it
constitutes  a test  of our  working  definition  of  a binding  quota,  i.e.  those
identified  by a  utilization  rate  of 90 percent  or above.
For the  comparison,  the  products/sup7liers  are  limited  to those
which  were subject  to  bilateral  quotas  in  respective  markets  both in 1981
and  1987.  19 Thus  the  eligible  products  in the  EC accounted  for  83  percent
of all  imports  of textile  products  from  developing  countries  subject  to
quotas  in 1987. The  respective  figures  for  the  US,  Canada  and  Sweden  were
67,  61  and 79  percent. Shipments  for  which  quota  utilization  rates  were 90
19  This is because,  with the exception  of the EC, reliable  data on
import  volumes  exist  only for  14FA  categories  that  are subject  to bilateral
quotas.19
percent  or above  in  the  earlier  periods,  i.e.,  1981,  1982  or 1983,  are
defined  as  being  subject  to  binding  quotas.
Volume  RestXaint
In all  four  markets,  the  1981-1987  annual  average  volume  growth  of
shipments  subject  to  binding  quotas  was lower  than  that  for  imports  falling
under  nonbinding  quotas  (see  Table  3).  For  the  EC, the  growth  rates  of the
two  categories  were  respectively  5.4  and  6.7  and for  the  US 2.4  and  13.6.
In  Canada  imports  fulfilling  the  requirement  above  and  not subject  to
binding  quotas  constituted  only  3  percent  of shipments  under  restrictions.
This  category  had a growth  rate  of 24.4  percent  as opposed  to a 2.8  percent
annual  g_owth  in  the  bound  items. In Sweden  the  distinction  in  growth
rates  was  marginal.
In the  two  major  markets,  based  on  volume  growth  in individual
shipments  (quota/supplier),  we applied  a (two-tai.ed)  t test  to  determine
whether  the  bound  categories'  sample  means  differed  significantly  from  that
of unbound  groups.  20  We found  that  in  the  case  of the  US there  was not
even  a 0.1  percent  probability  that  the  difference  was  coincidental  whereas
for  the  EC there  was  a 25 percent  chance.
Price  Jack-up
Changes  in  unit  values  reflect  two  phenomena;  (i)  the  price  mark-
20  In Canada  and  Sweden  the  number  of  unbound  categories/suppliers  was
too  small  to treat  them  individually.20
Table  3:  VOLUME  GROWTH  AND UNIT  VJALUE  CHANGES  IN 2MPORTS
OF TEXTILE PRODUCTS  FROM  DEVELOPING  SUPPLIERS UNDEd  BINDING
AND NONBINDING  QUOTAS  IN  THE EC,  US,  CANADA  AND SWEDEN
(1981-1987  average  annual  change,  percent)
EC  US  Canada  Sweden
I.  Change  in  volume
A.  Under  binding  quotas  5.4  2.4  2.8  3.1
B.  Under  nonbinding  quotas  6.7  13.6  24.4  3.2
II.  Change  in unit  value
A.  Under  binding  quotas  1.9  9.1  11.6  8.3
B.  Under  nonbinding  quotas  0.8  3.4  2.7  4.1
Memo itemL::
Shipments  above  (A  and  B)  as  a  percentage
of (the  value  of)  all imports  of textilo  products  from
developing  suppliers  subject  to  quotas  in 1987,  X
A.  51.0  56.5  58.1  65.8
B.  31.5  10.8  3.0  13.2
A.  +  B.  82.5  67.3  61.1  79.0
Source: World  Bank  computer  files  on MFA (see  the  Appendix  on data).
Note.:  The tabulation  covers  only products/suppliers  which  were subject  to
bilateral  quotas  in respective  markets  both in 1981  and in 1987.
Shipments  for  which  quota  utilization  rates  were 90 percent  or above
in  1981,  1982  or  1983  are  defined  as  being  subject  to  binding  quotas.21
up or the  quota  rent  and (ii)  product  "upgrading"  or quality  improve-
ments.  21  We did  not  attempt  to  distinguish  these  two.  22
It  was  observed  that  in  all  four  markets,  the increase  in the  unit
values  was considerably  greater  in the  case  of shipments  under  binding
quotas  compared  to those  falling  under  nonbinding  quotas  (see  Table  3).
For  the  EC,  the  average  annual  growth  rate  of the  unit  value  of the  bound
category  was 1.9  percent,  more  than  twice  the  0.8  percent  for  the  unbound.
The  difference  was even  greater  for  the  US,  respectively,  9.1  and 3.4
percent;  and  for  Canada  11.6  and  2.7  percent. In Sweden  the  growth  rate
for  the  bound  items  was  also  double;  8.3  and  4.1  percent.
When  a t test  was applied  to differences  in  the  unit  value  growth
of individual  shipments  falling  under  the  two  categories,  the  results  were
identical  with that  of volume  growth;  extremely  robust  for  the  US and
rather  weak for  the  EC.
We interpret  the  findings  in  this  section  as further  evidence  of
the  volume  restraining  and  value  increasing  effects  of the  MFA.  More
importantly,  the  evidence,  especially  in  the  case  of t?ie  US,  verifies  the
relevance  of identifying  bound  quotas  by the  high levelt  of quota
utilization  rates  - the  assumption  behind  the  main indicators  used in  the
previous  Section.
21  In this  respect  quantitative  restrictions  have  an effect  similar  to
that  of specific  as opposed  to  ad valorem  duties.
2  Cline  (1987),  by using  wholesale  price  indices,  attempts  to isolate
the  "upgrading"  effect.22
V.  CHANGES  IN IMPORT  MARKET  SHARES: A CONSEQUENCE  OF TRADE  DIVERSION?
When shipments  of some  exporters  are  bound  by quotas,  domestic
producers  and  other  foreign  suppliers  which  are  not  effectively
constrained,  i.e.,  those  which  either  are  not  subject  to  quotas  or have  not
reached  quota  ceilings  in the  products  concerned,  would  step in  and
partially  offset  this  effect. As less  established  developing  suppliers
would  more likely  fall  into  this  unconstrained  category,  they  are  among  the
potential  beneficiaries  of the  resulting  trade  diversion. Consistent  with
this  perception,  some  less  competitive  developing  exporters  regarded  the
extension  of HFA  as providing  a "guaranteed  market  share"  (Cable  (1987)).
However,  trade  diversion  due  to  MFA  also  occurs  in  favor  of the  exports
from  developed  countries  since  MFA  restrictions  do not  apply  to them
(Keesing  and  Wolf (1980)  and  Hamilton  (1988)).
The  starting  point  of our  analysis  in this  Section  is the
observation,  e.g.,  by Wolf (1987)  that  from  1981  to 1985,  US imports  of
textiles  and  clothing  from  Hong  Kong,  Korea  and  Taiwan  grew  at an  annual
rate  of less  than  10  percent,  while  those  from  other  developing  countries
had  a growth  rate  more than  twice  that (22  percent),  and the  growtb.  rate  of
those  items  from  Europe  was  over  three  times  (33  percent). We go a step
further  and  compare  the  1981-1987  changes  in  market  shares  of various
groups  of developing  and  developed  countries  in  precisely  those  products
for  which  the  established  developing  suppliers  faced  binding  quotas.
In  each  market,  a set  of  MFA categories  was identified  in  which
Hong  Kong,  Korea  and  Taiwan  had  quota  utilization  rates  of 90 percent  or
above  during  most  of the  1981-1987  period  (i.e.,  at least  four  years  in
each  case). Imports  in  these  product  categories  from  developing  countries23
accounted  for 56  percent  of EC's  1987  imports  of textile  products  from
developing  suppliers. This  coverage  ratio  was the  same  in the  case  of the
US, 77  percent  for  Canada  and 53  percent  for  Sweden.
It  was observed  that,  in these  products,  the  share  of the  three
established  developing  suppliers  in  EC's imports  declined  from  13  percent
in 1981  to 10.5  percent  in  1987  23  (see  Table  4)  while  this  share  in the
remaining  textile  products  did  not  change.  24 The  other  developing
exporters  that  had  bilateral  quotas  with  the  EC  made  a market  gain  roughly
corresponding  to  this  percentage.  Among  them,  it  was  only  Brazil,
Colombia,  Singapore  and  Uruguay  which  experienced  a  market  loss  of some
significance.  This  was  not  attributable  to the  MFA  as they  rarely  reached
quota  ceilings. Those  developing  countries  which  were  not  subject  to  MFA
restrictions  in the  EC  nearly  doubled  their  market  share  from  4.7 to  8.3
percent. These  were  predominantly  Mediterranean  associates  of the
Community. The  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  group  of countries,
which  enjoy  duty  free  status  in the  EC accorded  by the  Lome  Convention,  had
half a  percent  market  share  in  1981  which  became  0.8  percent  in 1987.
Developed  country  exporters,  including  Intra-EC(10)  trade,  had
around  65  percent  of the  market  in 1981. In 1987  this  was three  percentage
23  Intra-EC  trade  is included  in the  denominator  of the  market  shares.
For  comparability  EC(10)  is  considered  for  both 1981  and 1987.
24  This share,  not reported  in the  Table,  was slightly  over 7 percent
in both  periods. Given  the  higher  increase  in unit  values  of the  products
under  binding  quotas,  discussed  in  the  previous  Section,  the  decline  in  volume
share  was  considerable.2  4
Tabte 4:  CHANGES  IN IPoT  MARKET  SNAAE  OF SZPPLIEES  IN TEXTILE
PRODUCTS  WHICH  WERE  UNDER  BINOING  RESTRICTIONS  /a  FOR
HONG  KONG,  KOREA  AND  TAIWAN  IN THE  IC MARKET.  1961-1967
Supplier  Import  Market  Share  lb
I  it
1961  1967  Ill/
The  Three  13.07  10.48  0.80
HOn Kong  7.29  5.83  0.80
Korea.  Rep.  of  3.71  2.90  0.76
Taiwan  2.07  1.75  0.85
Other  Restricted  Devltoping  12.66  1S.40  1.22
Argentina  0.03  0.05  1.91
BangOdesh  0.12  0.14  1.16
OriZlt  0.81  0.5S  0.69
China  1.53  2.SS  1.66
Colambia  0.11  0.06  0.56
E9ypt  0.38  0.55  1.42
India  2.10  1.97  0.94
Indbnesia  0.13  0.60  4.74
Macau  0.86  0.86  1.00
Malaysia  0.39  0.39  0.99
Mexico  0.04  0.08  1.63
Pakistan  0.56  0.87  1.56
Peru  0.12  0.12  0.97
PhilPiPines  0.55  0.53  0.9.
ROmanif  1.23  1.08  0.J
Singapore  0.68  0.44  0.6S
Sri  Lanka  0.17  0.31  1.87
Theitand  0.J6  1.32  1.52
Uruguay  0.02  0.01  0.49
Yugoslavia  1.9S  2.89  1.48
All  Restricted  Oeveloping  25.73  2S.88  1.01
Other  Developing  4.74  8.33  1.76
ACP  0.52  0.81  1.56
All  DeeVloping  31.00  35.02  1.13
Eastern  Europe  4  2.65  2.23  0.84
Developed  Countrfes  64.67  61.51  (61.86)  E  O.95
Intra-EC  52.33  49.60  (55.08)  Ld  O."
TOTAL  OF  THE  ABOVE  100.00  100.00  1.00
Source:  World lank computer files  on  NFA  and  UNSO  COHTLMWE  Data  lase.
Notes:
La  MFA  prodket  groups  in  ihfch  HOng  Kong  Korea or  Taiwan had quOta  utiliZ&tion
rates  90 percent  or  above  more than half  of  the  period  (at  least  four  years)
1981-1987.
/b  Calculated  using.value  in  current  dollars.  Including  intra-EC  trade;  EC(10)
for  both  1981 and  1987.
/c Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary  and Poland.
/d EC(12).25
Tjbtt  S:  CAGINES  IN IMOT NARKET  SNARE  OF  SUPPLIERS  IN TEXTILE PRODOUCTS  WNICN  WERE  UNDER  BINDING  RESTRICTIONS  FOR
HOG  KONG,  KOREA  AND  TAI  IN THE  US  1AMAR  T.  1961-1967
Supplier  Imort  Market Share
I  it
1981  1967  11/1
The Three  55.11  43.45  0.79
Hong  Kong  22.78  17.28  0.76
Korea,  Rep, of  15.14  11.21  0.74
Taiwan  17.19  14.96  0.87
Other  Restricted  Developing  28.67  41.92  1.46
Bangladesh  0.02  1.66  102.22
Brazil  0.37  0.86  2.34
Burma  0.00  0.02  -
China  6.43  7.91  1.23
Coloambi  0.57  0.44  0.77
Costa Rice  0.53  1.06  2.01
Dominican Republic  1.34  2.08  1.55
Egypt  0.16  0.29  1.87
El  Salvador  0.14  0.13  0.93
Guatemla  0.01  0.22  3T.99
Haiti  0.80  0.71  0.86
India  2.55  2.69  1.06
Indonesia  0.S4  2.43  4.51
JavAica  0.23  1.03  4.41
Macau  1.41  .72  1.22
Malaysia  0.71  1.86  2.63
Maldives  0.02  0.07  3.84
Mauritius  0.14  0.68  4.78
Mexico  2.56  2.18  0.85
Nepal  0.00  0.16  -
Pakistan  0.78  0.99  1.27
Panam  0.03  0.26  866
Peru  0.45  0.22  0.49
Philippines  3.11  3.04  0.98
Romania  0.68  0.59  0.86
Singapore  2.26  2.84  1.26
Sri  Lanka  1.20  1.97  1.63
Thail  nd  1.30  1.70  1.30
Trinidad  9  Tobago  0.02  0.00  0.31
Turkey  0.01  1.27  142.51
Uruguay  0.23  0.36  1.59
Yugoslavia  0.10  0.46  4.81
ALt Restricted  oeveloping  83.78  85.37  1.02
Other  Developing  0.94  1.29  1.38
All  Developing  84.72  86.66  1.02
Caribbean Basin  Initiative  3.59  6.01  1.67
Eastern Europe  0.67  0.57  0.85
Developed Countries  14.54  12.77  0.88
TOTAL  OF  THE  ABOVE  100.00  100.00  1.00
Source:  World  Bank  computer  files  on MFA  and UNSO  CONTRADE  Data Base.
Note:  See  notes  to  Table 4.26
points  lower. Intra-EC  trade,  though,  was  up from  52 to 55  percent  when
EC(12)  was considered.
Developments  in the  US market  were  similar  to those  in the  EC.  The
share  of the  three  established  developing  suppliers  in  products  subject  to
binding  quotas  registered  a greater  decline,  however,  from  55  percent  in
1981  to  43 percent  in 1987 (see  Table  5)  while  in the  remaining  textile
products,  this  share  was  constant.  25  Other  developing  countries  which  had
bilateral  quotas  with the  US have  increased  their  sha:a  of the  market  by a
roughly  equal  amount,  13  percentage  points. For these  countries,
improvement  in  market  share  was  also  true  on an individual  basis. The  only
ones  which  had  a noteworthy  market  share  loss  were  Colombia,  Peru  and
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  none  of  which  was severely  constrained  by quotas.
Developing  countries  that  did  not  have  any  bilateral  quotas  with
the  US accounted  for  only  1  percent  of imports  in  products  under  question
and  increased  this  share  to  1.3  percent  by 1987. Countries  covered  by the
US Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI),  some  of  which  were nominally  subject
to  restrictions,  nearly  doubled  their  share  from  3.6  to 6  percent  of the
market.  26
Developed  country  exporters  did  not  make any  apparent  gains  from
25  This  share,  not  reported  in the  Table,  was  slightly  over  39  percent
in  both  periods.
26  The CBI countries  qualify  for the "Super  807" provision  whereby
imports  of textile  products  which  use  US inputs  fall  under  lenient  special
quotas  (see,  e.g.,  World  Bank (1988)). The  CBI  beneficiaries  are:  Antigua
& Barbuda,  Aruba,  Bahamas,  Barbados,  Belize,  Costa  Rica,  Dominica,  Dominican
Republic, El  Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti,  Honduras, Jamaica,
Montserrat,  Neth.Antilles,  Panama,  St.  Kitts  & Nevis,  St.  Lucia,  St.  Vincent
& Grenadines,  Trinidad  & Tobago  and  British  Virgin  Islands.27
the  restrictions  on the  major  developing  country  suppliers  in  the  US
market. Their  share  has declined  from  15 to 13  percent  during  the  1981-
1987  period.
In  Canada  the  decline  of the  market  share  of the  established
developing  suppliers  in  products  facing  binding  quotas  was  from  51 to 46
percent. The  other  developing  suppliers,  predominantly  subject  to quotas,
increased  their  market  share  by 11  percentage  points  while  the  share  of the
developed  countries  declined  from  28 to 23  percent.
In  Sweden  where  the  share  of developing  countries  in  textile
products  is  relatively  low,  the  situation  was slightly  different. While
the  established  developing  suppliers  (only  Hong  Kong  and  Korea  in this
case)  in  product  groups  for  which  they  faced  binding  quotas  declined  from
17 to 14  percent,  other  developing  countries  that  have  bilateral
arrangements  increased  their  share  by 2  percentage  points. Those
developing  suppliers  which  did  not  have quota  restrictions  doubled  their
marginal  share  from  1 to 2  percent. The  developed  countries  which  had a
prominant  share  of the  market,  71  percent,  maintained  their  position
throughout  1987.
We can  conclude  that  in  all  four  markets  studied,  binding
constraints  faced  by the  established  developing  suppliers  have apparently
been  associated  with loss  of market  shares. Except  in  the  US,  however,  the
scope  of this  seemed  rather  small.
Among  the  developing  countries  which  did  not  have  bilateral  quotas
with the  respective  markets,  only  the  Mediterranean  countries  in the  EC and
the  countries  covered  by the  Carribbean  initiative  in the  US seemed  to  have
any  noteworthy  market  share  gain  which  might  be associated  with28
restrictions  on major  suppliers.
We did  not find  any  apparent  gain  for  the  developed  country
exporters. The  case  which  came  closest  to  a galn  was Sweden,  where
developed  suppliers  maintained  their  market  shares. However  this,  and the
smallness  of their  market  share  losses  in  other  markets  might  be related  to
the  restrictions  on  major  developing  suppliers.
The  observed  changes  in  market  shares  are  not  necessarily  or fully
attributable  to the  MFA.  Such  changes  could  be due  to shifts  in
comparative  advantage. In  the  next  Section,  applying  a more  rigorous  model
framework  to selected  products,  we estimate  the  likely  magnitude  of trade
diversion  due to  MFA.29
VI.  A TRICKLE TO UNCONSTRAINED  DEVELOPING  SUPPLIERS DUE  TO MFA:
AN ESTIMATION
What is the  likely  magnitude  of trade  diverted  to  unconstrained
developing  countries  (i.e.,  those  which  either  are  not  subject  to quotas  or
have  not  reached  quota  ceilings)  from  established,developing  suppliers
constrained  by binding  quotas  under  the  MFA?
We address  this  question  by applying  a relatively  simple  model  that
nevertheless  incorporates  demand  and  alternative  supply  conditions.  To
limit  the  data  requirements  and  avoid  an  extremely  complex  model  structure
we confined  our  analysis  to  the  US imports  of a representative  group  of
apparel  products  which  are  supplied  predominantly  by developing  countrie.
The  Model  2 7
The  model  we employ  is  an extended  (and  simplified)  version  of the
model  developed  by Tarr (1987). This is  a partial  equilibrium  analysis,
i.e.,  the  clothing  sector  is examined  separately  from  the  rest  of the
economy. Following  the  Armington  (1969)  tradition,  goods  are  assumed  to  be
differentiated  according  to the  place  of production. In  the  model,  there
is only  one  group  of  consumers  - the  US consumers.  28  The consumers  are
buying  from  three  groups  of suppliers:  domestic  producers  (group  1),
constrained  foreign  (developing)  suppliers  (group  2),  and  unconstrained
foreign  (developing)  suppliers  (group  3).  Thus,  there  are  three  demand
27  For  details  of the  model,  see  the  Appendix.
28  This assumption  seems  to be valid for many inexpensive  clothing
items.  Developed countries import  substantial  amounts from developing
countries  while the  roverse  is insignificant.  The main shortcoming  of the
model,  on the  other  hand,  is that  it does  not incorporate  the  simultaneous
impact  of the  other  major  developed  country  markets,  particularly  the  EC.30
functions  for  each  good.  29
(1) QDI  - ai  +  PD 1 +  'yPDZ  + S1PD 3
where  QD 1 and  PDi  are,  respectively,  the  quantity  of demand  for  and
(consumer)  price  of prQduct  i (i  - 1,  2, 3).  As shown  in  equation  (1),  the
amount  of demand  for  product  i is influenced  by the  prices  of other
prodicts  as well  as  by its  own  price,  since  there  is (imperfect)
substitutability  among  produ.ct%.
Supply  is  characterized  by the  following  three  supply  functions:
(2) QSi  - ai  +  biPS 1
where  QSi  and  PSi  are  the  amount  of supply  and (producer)  price  of product
L  (i  - 1, 2, 3).
Under  tariffs  and  MFA  quotas,  consumer  prices  of foreign  products
differ  from  producer  prices. For  simplicity  when  we ignore  transportation
costs,  the  following  conditions  hold in  equilibrium:
(3)  PD 1 - PS 1
(4)  PD 2 - (1  + t) (1  +  m) PS 2
(5) PD 3 - (1  + t)PS 3
where,  t and  m are,  respectively,  the  tariff  rate  and  the  quota  premium  due
to the  MFA.  30  Furthermore,  in  equilibrium,  the  quantity  demanded  must  be
equal  to the  quantity  supplied.
29  We  shall  call  a  category  of  clothing  (e.g.,  shirts)  a "good",  and  the
same  good  from  different  suppliers  a "product".
30  Note that  m is endogeneous  in tho  model.  However,  in our model
estimations  we  plug  in  previously  estimated  values  of  m. See  the  Appendix  for
details.31
In the  absence  of quotas,  the  quota  premium  on  products  from  the
constrained  suppliers  disappears. In  order  to obtain  the  magnitude  of the
effects  of the  MFA,  we simply  compare  the  values  of  endogeneous  variables
under  quotas  with their  values  in the  absence  of quotas. More
specifically,  we can  calculate  the  magnitudes  of excess  domestic
production,  suppressed  trade  and  trade  diverted  due to the  MFA.
Estimation  Results
We applied  the  model  to  US imports  of six  broad  categories  of the
apparel  products. These  six  items  amount  to about  fifty  percent  of total
US clothing  imports. As shown  in  Table  6, developing  countries  accounted
for  over  90  percent  of total  imports  in these  products. For  simplicity,  we
ignored  the  imports  from  developed  countries. Given  that  imports  from
developed  countries  were less  than  10  percent  despite  the  MFA,  this
simplifying  assumption  is  not  unrealistic.
For  some  of the  parameter  values  of the  model,  we followed  Tarr and
Morkre's  (1984)  approach. Based  on Armington's  (1969)  formula,  own  price
elasticities  and  cross  price  elasticities  of differentiated  products  were
calculated  from  the  price  elasticity  of aggregate  clothing  and  elasticity
of substitution  for  each  product. Furthermore,  for  the  quota  premium  we
used  Pelzman's  (1988)  estimates  of the  tariff  equivalents  of the  MFA
quotas. As given  in the  Appendix,  Pelzman's  estimates  are  in the  range  of
28 to 37  percent.  These  are  comparable  with  Hamilton's  (1988)  estimate  for
the  US quotas  on  Hong  Kong's  clothing  exports. The  values  of the  other  key
parameters  used in the  estimations  are  also  given  in the  Appendix  on the
model.32
able  6:  US DX@STS  Of SILTD  AIPARL  PRODUCtS.  1986
Value  of  Xmigorts.  wilin  USS
From  all  from  developing  Share  of
sourcoe  countrie  developing
Contrtained  Unconstrained  countrieso  percont
Knit  shirts  and  blouses  2072.5  1718.5  245.7  94.8
Mm &  boys  shirts,
not  knit  1239.7  959.3  225.3  95.6
Wom  - girls  shirts
and  blouses,  not  knit  1343.0  1068.6  174.0  94.4
Sw,atorrs  man-made  fibre  864.3  415.6  398.4  92.5
Trousers,  slacks  and  shorts  2432.e  1708.4  464.8  89.3
Undorzwar  167.6  80.3  65.2  88.6
Total  ot  the  above  8119.9  5950.7  1577.4  92.7
Source:  The World Bank  computer files  on MFA.
otor:  Tho six  product  groups  listed  abovo are.  respectively,  the  following  US MFA  catogorios:
(i)  338.  339.  638,  639.  (ii)  340,  640,  Ciii)  341,  641,  tiv)  645,  646, tv)  347,  3468.  647.
648,  and tvi)  352,  652.33
Table  7  provides  a  summary  of our  estimation  results. The
magnitude  of the  alleged  "spillover'  appears  to  be fairly  low.  Due  to the
decline  in  shipments  from  constrained  developing  suppliers,  the
unconstrained  suppliers  could  increase  their  shipments  of these  six
clothing  items  by less  than  two  hundred  million  dollars. This  was  only 14
percent  of the  revenue  from  current  shipments  of the  six  items  from  the
unconstrained  developing  exporters.
Our  results  suggest  that  the  main  beneficiaries  of the  MFA are  the
domestic  producers  in  the  importing  country. In the  case  of the  six
product  groups  we studied,  the  value  of shipments  from  unconstrained
developing  countries  seemed  to  have increased  by roughly  two  hundred
million  dollars  due  to the  MFA  while  domestic  producers  expanded  their
output  by 1.6  billion  dollars  or 10  percent  over  their  1986 level.  31  It
should  also  be noted  that  this  gain  was  on top  of domestic  production  made
viable  by very  high tariffs  (shown  in  the  Appendix).
Our  estimations  also  show  that  the  volume  of imports  from
constrained  developing  suppliers  were  curtailed  by 19  percent  (or  over  one
billion  dollars  at  nonquota  prices)  due  to  MFA quotas.  32  However  as this
31  This is considerably  higher  than  the  Trela-Whalley  (1988)  estimate
of a 3.4  percent  change  in  the  output  of  US producers.
32  Trela  and  Whalley  (1988)  estimated  that  US imports  would  have been
130  percent  higher  than  its  current  level  if there  were  no MFA quotas. Our
comparable  figure  is 15 percent  (and 35 percent  assuming  infinite  supply
elasticities). There were three sources  for this discrepancy:  (i) the
parameter  value  used for the  import  demand  elasticity  (0.28  in the  present
paper  versus  0.60),  (ii)  substitutability  of goods  (the  Armington  assumption
adopted  here  versus  homogeneous  goods),  and (iii)  the  simplification  adopted
by Trela  and  Whalley  that  all  quotas  were  binding.34
TW  ble:  ESTIMATE  OF THE  IMPACT  OF THE  NMA  ON  SELECTED  APPAPEL
PROOUCTS  lb  THE  US  MARKET,  1966
Increased value  of  shipments  As a percentag.  of  1986 shipments
(million  US$)
Domestic  Dovtlofina  sutoliers  Domestie  Devetocina suacliers
supptiers  Constrairnd  Unconstrained  suppliers  Constrained  Unconstraired
Knit  shirts  and  blouses  420.5  -16.6  40.5  18.0  -1.0  19.7
Ren I  boys'  shirts,
not  knit  200.4  -7.4  37.9  18.4  -0.8  20.1
Women  & girls'  shirts
nd blouses,  not  knit  284.1  -41.8  22.9  13.9  -3.6  15.2
Swesters, man-made  fibre  78.3  -20.2  57.6  15.5  -4.6  16.9
Trousers,  slacks  & shorts  592.3  -165.9  34.8  7.4  -8.8  8.1
Underwear  34.2  -12.6  1.2  1.6  -13.5  1.7
Total  of  the  above  1,609.8  -264.4  194.9  10.0  -4.3  14.1
Memo  item:
Changes  due to  the
quantity  effect  alone  947.3  -1,116.9  127.8  5.9  -18.6  9.2
Note:  Changes  due  to  the  quantity  effect  alone  give  the  changes  in  the  value  of  shipments  of  thv  six  items
under  MFA  quotas  valued  at  the  non-quota  price.35
quantity  decline  was  largely  offset  by  higher  prices  due  to quotas,  their
revenue  losses  were  considerably  lower;  roughly  three  hundred  million
dollars  (4  percent).
To test  the  sensitivity  of  our  results  with respect  to the  supply
conditions,  we estimated  the  model  assuming  infinite  supply  elasticities
for  all (domestic  and  developing)  suppliers. The  results  of this  exercise,
given  in  the  Appendix,  might  be interpreted  as a longer  term  adjustment
accounting  for  developments  such  as investments.  Accordingly,  the
unconstrained  developing  suppliers  made  approximately  three  hundred  million
dollars  of additional  sales  (25  percent)  and  the  constrained  ones  have lost
nearly  nine  hundred  million  dollars  (13  percent). Domestic  US production
increased  by 2.8  billion  dollars  (19  percent)  due to the  MFA.  The  results
of the  high scenario  do not  change  the  essence  of the  argument  that  the
gains  of the  less  restricted  developing  countries  are  relatively  small,
while  the  main  beneficiaries  of the  MFA are  the  domestic  producers  in  the
importing  country. The  high  scenario,  on the  other  hand,  underlines  that
the  established  developing  suppliers  may  be losing  in a  big  way.
Gains  for  Marginal  Suppliers
In  our  estimation,  we treated  all  unconstrained  developing
suppliers  as a single  group. While  the  magnitude  of the  trade  gains  for
this  group  as a whole  might  be small,  this  does  not  preclude  the  fact  that
some  marginal  suppliers  might  have  enjoyed  a  major  spillover  from the  NFA.
For  example,  during  the  period  1981-1986,  the  value  of shipments  of these36
six  product  groups  from  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI)  countries  33
to the  US increased  by an annual  average  of 32  percent  - twica  the  rate  of
the  US imports  of these  products  from  all  sources. Although  they  are
marginal  suppliers  to the  US, these  twenty-two  countries,  by quadrupling
the  value  of their  shipment%,  were  able  to capture  almost  twice  their
previous  share  of the  US import  market  for  the  six  items  - from  less  than  3
percent  in 1981  to 5.6  percent  in  1986.
33  Although  some  of the  sixteen  MFA categories  that  comprise  the  six
items  were  under  restriction  in  a  few  of  the  CBI  countries  during  this  period,
these  countries  can  be considered  unconstrained  on th-  whole. In  only three
instances  during  the  six  years  were quotas  filled  by more than  90 percent  -
twice  for  Haiti  and  once  for  the  Dominican  Republic.37
VII.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The  two  questions  pursued  in the  paper  convey  two  messages  to the
workshop,  one  concerning  the  urgency  of action  in the  direction  of
dismantling  the  MFA,  the  other  relating  to the  exaggeration  of the  scope  of
trade  gains  purportedly  enjoyed  by some  developing  countries  due  to  MFA.
These  messages  are:  (i)  MFA  has  not  been  eased  out,  on the  contrary  it  has
become  tougher  for  most developing  exporters  especially  for  the  successful
newcomers,  and (ii)  trade  gains  for  less  established  exporters  resulting
from  MFA  may  be exaggerated.
An Increasingly  Restrictive/Effective  MFA
At the  stage  of their  conception,  the  only  acceptable  element  of
MFA  and  the  arrangements  preceding  it  was  probably  the  purportedly
temporary  nature  of these  measures  to  give  breathing  space  in the
structural  adjustment  process. However  not  only  has  MPA  become  permanent,
its  restrictiveness/effectiveness  has  generally  increased  in  terms  of (i)
the  share  of trade  subject  to restrictions,  (ii)  quota  utilization  rates,
(iii)  the  share  of shipments  facing  binding  quotas,  and (iv)  developments
in  volume  and  unit  value  of shipments  under  binding  quotas.
Given  this  development,  the  question  Is  whether  now the  economies
of the  industrialized  countries  are  more  or less  prepared  for  an
elimination  of non-tariff  barriers  in  textiles  and  clothing,  compared  to,
say  early  1980s. More  importantly,  if the  current  trend  in the
restrictions  under  MFA continues,  would  this  facilitate  adjustment  to freer
trade  by mid  or late  1990s?
Sweden,  taking  the  wise lesson  from  its  painful  experience  with
iron  and  steel  and  shipbuilding  industries,  says  n2 and  has decided  to38
terminate  its  textile  and  clothing  quotas  when the  current  MFA expires. We
would  like  to interpret  the  April  1989  resolution  on textiles  and  clothing
of the  GATT Contracting  Parties  as expressing  the  same intent.
Exaggerated  Trade  Gains  for  the  Less  Establisbed
While  it  was  sheer  capitulation  to  far  stronger  parties  in  world
trade,  the  generally  .hared  belief  that  there  was  also  some  grors  benefit
for  all  parties  involved  made  the  acceptance  of  MFA  by the  developing
countries  less  painful. For the  smaller  and/or  relatively  new developing
suppliers,  this  was tbe  prospect  of capturing  the  trade  diverted  from  the
established  developing  suppliers  due  to  binding  MFA  quotas. While  apparent
changes  in  market  shares  lend  support  to  thia  presumption,  what is
attributable  to the  MFA  turns  out to  be generally  mea&er. Estimations
reveal  that  in  products  which  are  predominantly  supplied  by developing
countries,  the trade  gains  of nonrestricted  developing  suppliers  taken  as a
whole  add  up to  not  more than  15  percent,  in the  most  extreme  scenario  25
percent,  of their  exports  - while  the  domestic  producers  in the  protected
market  are  the  main  beneficiaries.
Therefore,  except  for  the  marginal  suppliers  for  whom the  MFA  might
have  been the  principal  rWason  of their  emergence,  the  purported  trade
gains  for  the  needy  appear  to  be a  weak  argument. This is  especially  true
considering  the  fact  that  any  exporter  soon  finds  itself  restricted  under
the  MFA in the  event  of sizable  supply  response.39
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APPENDIX  ON THE DATA
Coverage
The  World  Bank  computer  files  on MFA  contain  the  following  variables,
all  in  national  MFA  categories  of the  importing  developed  countries: (i)  quota
levels,  in  volume,  (ii)  actual  shipments  in  volume  and (iii)  in  value,  and (iv)
volume  conversion  factors,  e.g.,  metric  ton  equivalents,  when relevant. (v)  A
fifth  variable,  unit  value,  is  derived  from  the  above (with  exception  when  unit
values  are provided  by the  national  authorities). Also concordances  for  each
national  MFA group (for  each  year)  with national  tariff  nomenclature  and with
SITC  revision  2 are  stored  (the  latter  concordances  being  approximations).
As exRorters,  all developing  countries  and territories 1 are recorded
individually,  whether  or not they  are subject  to MFA restrictions. Data for
actual shipments into the markets concerned are stored for all suppliers,
developed  and  developing. The  perio  of coverage  is  1981  to the  current  period
with  one-year  lag,  i.e.,  currently  1987.  For  the  time  being  four  industrial  markets
are  covered: EC,  USA,  Canada  and  Sweden.
Sources  and  Some  Specifics
Data  for  EC  imports  under  MFA  categories  are  available  from  the  Community
(microfiche  SCE  2510)  in  terms  of  both  quantity  and  value,  specifying  the  source
of  the  shipments.  Imports  subject  to  the  restrictions  and  those  which  fall  outside
1  Developing  countries  and  territories  are  defined  in accordance  with the
most commonly  used  definition  for  comparability. This classification  has no
prejudice  whatsoever  as to  the  status  of the  countries  and territories  and  their
treatment  by the  World  Bank.  Accordingly,  developed  market  economies  comprise
OECD  (excluding  Turkey),  Israel  and  South  Africa. Socialist  (developed)  countries
consist  of Eastern  European  Socialist  countries  (including  USSR but excluding
Romania  and  Yugoslavia).  All  other  countries,  including  Socialist  countries  of
Asia  (and  Romania,  Turkey  and  Yugoslavia)  are  designated  as  developing  countries.43
App. 1.2
are  also  distinguished.  Initial  quota  levels  specified  in  volume  were  extracted
from  the EG Journal  and merged  with the  data set  on shipments. Modifications
in  the  quotas  resulting  from  the  application  of flexibility  provisions  could  not
be incorporated  since  this  information  is  not available  in  a compiled  form.
For the US, data on volume of quotas and actual shipment  for MEA
categories  are  available  in the  "Expired  Restraints  of the  Performance  Report"
of  t:he  Department  of  Commerce. Based  on  the  concordances  (for  respective  years)
between  the  national  US tariff  nomenclature,  TSUSA,  and the  MFA groups,  it  was
possible  to  ascertain  the  value  of trade  under  specific  restrictions  using  the
trade  values  available  on tape  from  the  Bureau  of  Census  according  to the  former
claLssification.  All  three  types  of  restrictions  namely  the  "designated  consultation
levtels"  "minimum  consultation  levels"  and  'specific  limits"  were  treated  similarly
as  quotas.  The  US  data  take  into  consideration  modifications  to  the  initial  quotas.
The Canadian  data  originate  from the  Department  of External  Affairs,
Import  Controls  Division  I  of the  Special  Trade  Relations  Bureau.  Quotas  and
shipments,  in quantity,  are  available  in "Restraint  Utilization  by Product"  of
this Bureau.  Values are derived from the avera-e unit values per product
group/exporter,  given  in  "Import  Table  by Product  - Imports  Unit  Price". Quotas
are  defined  to include  "consultation  levels"  and "export  authorization  limits".
The Swedish  data  on constraints  are  compiled  by the  National  Board  of
Trade  in  volume  terms  for  MFA  groups. Actual  import  figures  in  value  terms  from
the  Central  Bureau  of Statistics  were  matched  with the  MFA categories.
The kind collaboration  of the  national  agencies  named above and the
valuable  help extended  by their  officials  are  gratefully  acknowledged.1-11 uwl b  eau b!Juloume  o°  AluD *sfos  fq
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APPENDIX  ON THE MODEL
I.  Structure  of the  Model
Our analysis  in the  paper  is  a partial  equilibrium  analysis,  i.e.,  we
consider  the  market  of  each  clothing  'good'  separately.  Each  good  is  differentiated
by the  place  of  production:  (i)  the  product  of  domestic  suppliers  (group  1);  (ii)
the  product  of constrained  foreign  suppliers  (group  2); and (iii)  the  product
of  unconstrained  foreign  suppliers  (group  3).  There  is  only  one  group  of  consumers
.in  the  model. This  gives  us the  following  three  demand  functions:
(Al)  QD 1 -c,  +  BPD1 +  71PD2 +  61PD3
(A2)  QDZ  - a2  +  B2PD 1 +  7 2PD 2 +  62PD3
(A3)  QD 3 - 0 3 +  B3PD 1 +  73PD 2 +  63PD 3
where  QD 1 and  PD 1 are, respectively,  the  quantity  demanded  and the  demand  price
of  the  i-th  product.  Supply  is  characterized  by  the  following  three  supply  demand
functions:
(A4)  QS1 - a,  +  bIPS1
(AS)  QS 2 - a2 +  b2PS2
(A6)  QS 3 - a3 + b3PS3
where  QS 1 and  PS 1 are,  respectively,  the  quantity  supplied  and  the  supply  price
of  the  i-th  product.
Under  the  nonquota  equilibrium  (without  the  MFA) the  following  equalities
hold:
(A7)  QD1 - QS1
(A8) QD2 - QS2
(A9)  QD3 - QS3
(A10)  PD 1 - PS1
(All)  PD 2 - (1  +  t)PS 246
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(A12) PD 3 - (1  +  t)PS 3
where  t  is  tariff  rate. Under  the  nonquota  equilibrium,  the  above  12  independent
equations  determine  12 endogenous  variables  (QD 1, QD 2 - QD 3, QS 1 I, QS 2, QS 3, PD 1,
PD 2, PD 3, PS 1, PS 2, PS 3).
Under  the  quota  equilibrium  (with  (NFA)  the  values  of QD2 and  QS 2 have
to be exogenously  determined  by Q 2.
(A13) QD 2 - C2
(A14)  QS 2 - Q2
The demand  price of product 2 is no longer  the sam  as th. tariff-inclusive
supply  price  of product  2,  but
(A15)  PD 2 - (1  + t)  (1  +  m)PS 2
where  m  is  rate  of  price  mark-up  due  to  the  MFA  quota.  Under  the  quota  equilibrium,
13 independent  equations  ((Al)-(A7),  (A9)-(AlO),  (A12),  (A13)-(A15))  determine
13  variables  (QD 1, QD 2, QD 3,  QS 1, QS 2, QS 3, PD 1, PD 2, PD 3, PS 1 I  PS 2, PS 3 and  m)
II.  EstimatioXI  Method
In order  to  obtain  the  magnitude  of the  impact  of the  MFA, the  values
of endogenous  variables  in the  above  two  equilibria  were compared. Instead  of
estimating  the values of all coefficients,  we used an indirect  method.  We
assumed  that  the  prices  and  quantities  observed  in  1986  were equilibrium  values
determined  by  the  specified  system  of  supply  and  demand  equations  (under  MFA  quotas)
and  we  obtained  values  of  parameters  by using  actual  values  of  endogenous  variables
in  1986. Note that,  when own-price  elasticities,  cross-price  elasticities,  and
supply  elasticities  are known,  we can obtain  the  values  of b's, B's, 'ys, and
6's:
QD 1 - I  +  BPD1 +  71PD 2 +  61PD 347
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- X  .QD 1 . PD,
aPD 1 QD,
- - P,*  PD 1
QD 1
where  ell  is  the  own-price  elasticity  of  product  1,
then,  1 - 1*  QD 1
PD 1
-Since  the  own-price  elasticities  and cross-price  elasticities  of individual
products  are  difficult  to  obtain,  we  used  the  Aruington  (1969)  technique,  which
makes  it  possible  to  derive  individual  elasticities  from  the  jggxegr.g  elasticity
(n),  the  value  share  of  each  product  (SI),  and  the  elasticity  of  substitution  (a).
By  assuming  CES  functions,  Armington  derived  the  following:
dX±ij  _  dD
el-
- jD  d
-(( - Stj)U±  +  SLj,1l  -
Pik
+k;j(  SIkO  - S.  dPlik
Pk
From  this  formulation,  it  follows:
ejj  - (l-Sl)  a  +  Si"
cjj  m  (Sj  o  - Sj.)
where  e.,  - own  price  elasticity  of  product  i,  and
c  - cross  price  elasticity  of  product  i  with  respect  to  the  price  of
product  j.
Furthermore,  we obtained  the  value  of  shift  parameters(a's  and  a's)  by using
available  estimates  of  m (quota  premium)  and  the  values  of  the  other  parameters48
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Tabl  AIIJ 1:  AVERAGE  TARIFF  RATES  AND QUOTA  PREMIUMS  FOR  SELECTED
APPAREL  PRODUCTS  IN  THE US MARKET
Tariff  rato (t)  Quota  premium  (a)
(percent)
Knit shirts  and  blouses  26.4  32.2
Men  & boys'  shirts  non-knit  18.5  32.6
Women  & girls'  shirts
and  blousesi  not  knit  20.3  30.6
-Sweaters,  man-made  fiber  28.4  36.8
Trousers,  slacks  & shorts  21.6  29.6
Underwear  19.3  28.9
Souce:  US DepartLient  of Commerce  Trade  Tapes  and Pelzman's  (1988)  estimates.49
App.  I.  5
which  were  derived  as described  above.
III.  Yalues  gf Kev  PArameters
(1)  Quota  premium  (m)  and tariff  rate (t)
(2)  Demand  elastiticies
As explained  above,  individual  own-price  elasticities  and cross-price
elasticities  can  be  obtained  from  the  agg&agaCe  demand  elasticity  (q).  the  elasticity
of  substitution  among  products(o),  and  the  value  share  of  each  product  (S 1). St's
were calculated  from  actual  trade  data. We  used  ,  - 0.282: Houthakker  (1965)  s
estimate  which is  used in  the  Tarr-Morkre  (1984)  study. We set  a - 3,  whlch is
approximately  the  aid-point  of the  high and  low  estimates  (  4.39 and  1.41)  used
in the  Tarr-Morkre  study.
(3)  Supply  elasticities
We adopted the following  values for supply  elasticities:  domestic
suppliers,  1.5;  constrained  and  unconstrained  developing  suppliers,  2.0.
IV.  Sensitivity  Analysis  with respect  to SuDnly_nditions
The results  of the  main estimate  using the  parameter  values  reported
above  are  presented  in the  main  text  Table  7. Table  AII.2  gives  the  comparable
results  when all three  supply  elasticities  are set  to infinity.50
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TcLIAll.2s I  ZSTINATI  FM TER DACT  of  TM HA 0N SL=C?D
APPAU  L PbOOUCTS  IN TE  US HKUM?. 198S
Ineresoud value  of  shipentc  As a percentaa.  of  1986  sbipments
(million  USAo
Daotmeuti  Develoion  sg2tin ler  Denestio  Dev.1osinn  munolierm
suppliare  Conrtrained  Unconstrainod  suppliers  Constrained  Uneconstrained
Knit  shirts  a blouses  756.7  -174.6  67.6  37.8  -9.2  37.8
Mm a boys shirts
not  knit  363.3  -94.0  53.7  39.2  -8.9  39.2
Iomn  *  girls  shirts
and blouse*.  not  knit  498.2  -1'9.5  37.2  za.-  -12.3  27.2
5weetcrs. an-made  tibro  140.0  -60.7  95.5  31.5  -12.7  31.5
-. Trouserrs  slacks a  *horte  985.3  -361.3  53.6  13.0  -17.5  13.0
Underwear  53.9  -22.3  1.7  2.6  -21.8  6.8
Total  ot  tho  above  2.797.2  -862.6  319.0  16.6  -12.7  25.1
Changs due to  quantity
effect  alone  2,797.2  -2,287.3  319.0  16.8  -33.6  18.6PPR  Working  Papgr  Series
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